University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 18
Number 1 Fall, 1987

Article 13

1987

Recent Developments: First English Evangelical
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles: Tile
Evolution of the Just Compensation Clause-Court
Requires Monetary Compensation for Temporary
Regulatory Taking of Property
Martin S. Goldberg

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Goldberg, Martin S. (1987) "Recent Developments: First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles: Tile
Evolution of the Just Compensation Clause-Court Requires Monetary Compensation for Temporary Regulatory Taking of Property,"
University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 18 : No. 1 , Article 13.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol18/iss1/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

this long standing law to this case, the dissent found that the warrant specified that
only McWebb's apartment could be searched. Therefore, the search of Garrison's
apartment was warrantless and because the
state did not advance any exceptions to the
warrant requirement, all evidence seized
from the search should have been suppressed.
In addition, the dissent found the majority's analysis concerning the reasonableness
of the way in which the warrant was
executed to be unpersuasive. Because
multiple-occupancy buildings are now
common, the conduct of the officers could
hardly be deemed reasonable. The dissent
found any reasonable basis for the search
to be lacking because the police failed to
thoroughly investigate the premises before
obtaining the warrant; failed to question
Garrison prior to beginning the search as
to the location of his residence, and failed
to take into account the obvious lay-out of
the third floor which revealed two separate apartments. As viewed by the dissent,
these facts, would have enabled a
reasonable officer to realize the factual
mistake before any contraband was seized.
Garrison, provides another example of
the Supreme Court's willingness to broaden the good-faith exception to the warrant
requirement. Although case-by-case analysis can only determine if the good-faith
exception to the warrant requirement has
been fulfilled, if Garrison is the benchmark
by which good-faith is measured then it
seems clear that in most cases good-faith
will be found.

- Amy Kushner
First English Evangelical Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles:
TIlE EVOLUTION OF THE JUST
COMPENSATION CLAUSECOURT REQUIRES MONETARY
COMPENSATION FOR
TEMPORARY REGULATORY
TAKING OF PROPERTY
Marred by a history of incomplete clarification, the issue of whether a landowner
is entitled to compensation for a temporary regulatory taking of property pursuant to the Just Compensation Clause of
the fifth amendment of the United States
Constituion has finally been settled in First

English Evangelical Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, 107 S.Ct. 2378
(1987), (First English). Historically, the
remedy for a taking of property by inverse
condemnation was invalidation of the
unconstitutional regulation, but the
United States Supreme Court in First
English has authoritatively held in a 6-3

decision that monetary relief is an acceptable remedy.
The First English Evangelical Church of
Glendale owned and operated a camp
(Lutherglen) for handicapped children in
Angles Natural Forest. In February of
1978 a storm flooded the watershed. The
massive infusion of water forced the Mill
Creek, which ran through Lutherglen, to
overflow its banks. Consequently, the
property was inundated, the buildings
were destroyed and the camp was rendered
useless unless rebuilt.
Subsequently, in response to an everpresent hazardous flood condition posed by
an earlier topographic change in the Mill
Creek Canyon, Los Angeles County
adopted an ordinance, which read in part,
"[a] person shall not construct, reconstruct,
place or enlarge any building or structure,
any portion of which is, or will be, located
within the outer boundry lines of the
interim flood protection area located in
Mill Creek Canyon." Id. at 2381-2382,
cltmg Los Angeles, Ca., Interim
Ordinance No. 11,855 (Jan. 1979) (emphasis added). The law adversely affected the
Church's interest in Lutherglen, prohibiting its reconstruction.
In response to the regulation the Church
filed suit in the Superior Court of California alleging that the law denied the church
of all use of the property. FollowingAgins
v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266 (1979), the court
denied relief by inverse condemnation.
Agins stands for the proposition that maintenance of a suit for damages in inverse
condemnation cases is the equivalent of
coercing the state to exercise its eminent
domain powers. Thus the only relief, in
California, when a regulation was found a
denial of a substantial amount of property
rights would have been declaratory relief
or mandamus. See, Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
On appeal, the California Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court decision
on similar grounds and, "because the
United States Supreme Court has not yet
ruled on the question of whether a state
may constitutionally limit the remedy for
a taking to nonmonetary relief." 107 S.Ct.
2383. The Church appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. 478 U.S. - 0 106
S.Ct. 3292 (1986). In prior cases seeking to
address the issue, the Court had refused to
settle the matter because in those appeals
the Court had deemed each case as "not
ripe" or "lacking finality." Se~ Mac·

Donald, Sommers and Frates v. Yolo Coun·
ty 106 S.Ct. 2561 (1986) (A lack of a fmal
determination by a county planning board
as to how to apply a regulation prevents a
decision of whether a taking has occur-

red.), Williamson County Regional Plan

ning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172 (1985) (Petitioners failure to exhaust
all state remedies to resolve a situation,
[i.e. application for a zoning variance, following state administrative procedures to
collect compensation before filing suit,]
renders the case as pending therefore precluding a decision by the Court for a lack
of finality at the state level.), San Diego Gas
andElec. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981)
(When a state court decision is not final,
the Court cannot review the case pursuant
to 28 U.S.c. § 1257.), Agins v. Tiburon,
4n U.S. 255 (1980).
Despite the fact that the ordinance had
yet to be deemed unconstitutional as a taking of property without providing just
compensation, the Court did address the
compensation issue. Seegenerally, 107 S.Ct.
at 2389-2390 (Where the dissenting opinion refuses to agree with the majority
opinion because of the "lack of finality"
issue).
In its opinion, the Court noted that the
Just Compensation clause of the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution applies to the states throught the fourteenth amendment. Therefore, a state is
required to financially compensate a property owner for an actual physical taking.
Furthermore, under Mahon, a regulation
may be so excessive that it works a taking
under inverse condemnation theory, denying the property owner of the use of the
land without taking the property itself. Id.
at 2386. The Court perceived no difference
in the circumstances when a state physically deprives a landowner of its rights by
eminent domain and when the depravation is perpetrated by regulatory encroachment. Thus, because there are not
distinguishing differences between eminent domain and inverse condemnation
takings, the Court held that the just compensation clause warrants monetary compensation in the regulatory taking
situation.
Under the facts in First English, the
petitioner-Church alleged a taking for the
period commencing from the time when
the ordinance because effective accruing
up until when the regulation would be
struck down. Typically, U[o]nce a court
determines that a taking has occurred, the
government retains the whole range of
options already available-amendment of
the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or the exercise of eminent domain," Id. at 2389, thus leaving the
property owner harmed for the period of
time in which the law was effective. Until
First English. landowners had no opportunity to recover damages for the "regulatory wrongs" of local government.
Siding with the Church's argument, the
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Court declared, "[w]e merely hold that
where the government's activities have
already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide
compensation for the period during which
the taking was effective." Id. Thus, on
remand, should a California court declare
the ordinance to effect a taking, Los
Angeles County must compensate the
Church for a period beginning when the
ordinance became effective until it is
declared void.
Having finally clarified the issue of
damages for inverse condemnation, landowners may feel relieved that they can
receive compensation should a local
government go too far in regulating land
use. Anyone desiring to challenge such
laws promulgated pursuant to police
powers must still follow local and state
procedures in pursuit of administrative
remedies before a regulation may be challenged as an unconstitutional taking. Only
then will the law be struck down when the
challenger proves that it has been denied of
all reasonable uses of the land. See general·
ly, Id. at 2389.
As a result of First English. the Court has
extended the Just Compensation Clause to
the fullest extent possible by allowing
compensation for a temporary regulatory
taking of property. In subjecting local,
state and federal goverments to financial
liability, despite a legislative power to
amend or repeal an excessively encroaching law, the Court has simultaneously provided the widest possible protection of
property rights and also inhibited local
governments in their attempts to regulate
land use by the police powers.

-Martin S. Goldberg
Reagan (.I. Rider:·STEPPARENT
COMMITIlNG CHILD ABUSE
UABLE FOR INTENTIONAL
INFUCTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS
In Reagan t:I. Rider, 70 Md. App. 503, 521
A.2d 1246 (1987), the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the position
of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
by holding that a teenage girl who had suffered from a six-year pattern of sexual
abuse inflicted by her stepfather proved
causation and injury sufficient for the jury
to consider her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In so holding,
the court has given a clear signal that a
stepparent committing child abuse may be
sued for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
Glenda Ann Rider began living with her
34-The Law Forum/Fall, 1987

mother, stepfather, grandmother and two
stepbrothers at age ten. She claimed that
she was the victim of several hundred sexual encounters with her stepfather which
occurred while she was between the ages
of eleven and seventeen. The encounters
included sexual contact such as masturbation and cunnilingus, but not sexual intercourse. At first, she did not resist, but as
she grew older she began to resist and
eventually reported the activity to her
mother. At her mother's urging, the police
were notified and criminal charges were
brought against the stepfather, John Matthew Reagan. Mr. Reagan was tried and
acquitted of the criminal charges.
A civil suit including a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was
brought in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The intentional infliction
of emotional distress was the only count
submitted to the jury and a verdict in favor
of Ms. Rider in the amount of $28,845
($18,845 compensatory damages and
$10,000 punitive damages) was entered.
Mr. Reagan appealed.
The court of special appeals noted that
the four elements necessary to impose
liability for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress are essentially
those listed in Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Ch. 2, Emotional
Distress (1965) are as follows:
(1) The conduct must be intentional or
reckless;
(2) The conduct must be extreme and
outrageous;
(3) There must be a causal connection
between the wrongful conduct and
the emotional distress; and
(4) The emotional distress must be
severe.
The court of special appeals viewed the
case as presenting two questions:
(1) Whether the evidence presented at
trial was legally sufficient to allow
submission of the case to the jury on
the issue of causation; and
(2) Whether the evidence presented at
trial was legally sufficient to allow
submission of the case to the jury on
the issue of the severity of emotional
distress?
Reagan, 70 Md. App. at 505, 521 A.2d at
1247.
Ms. Rider testified at trial that because of
the sexual advances of her stepfather she
had suffered extreme embarrassment,
depression, mortification, humiliation and
severe weight gain. In addition, Ms. Rider
claimed that the sexual abuse hampered
her ability to form normal relationships
and caused her to engage in forms of unusual sexual behavior.
At trial, the testimony was supported by

the opinion of Dr. Michael N. Spodak, a
forensic and clinical psychiatrist, who testified as an expert.
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland separated its written opinion
into two parts in order to deal with the
two issues of causation and severity.
In regard to the issue of causation, appellant asserted that appellee failed to show a
causal connection because the appellee's
emotional distress did not become
apparent immediately after and in direct
response to the sexual acts. Moniodis 'D.
Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212, cen.
denied, 304 Md. 631 (1985). The Reagan
court however, rejected the interpretation
that Moniodis requires that the distress
must immediately follow the event which
caused it.
Appellant further argued that there was
evidence of other traumatic events which
could have contributed to Ms. Rider's distress. This argument was also rejected by
the court since the testimony of both Ms.
Rider and Dr. Spodak indicated that any
other possible causes of Ms. Rider's distress were directly attributable to appellant's conduct.
Accordingly, the court found adequate
evidence from which a jury could find that
appellee's emotional distress was caused by
appellant's sexual abuse.
In regard to the issue of severity, the
Reagan court noted that the court of
appeals requires the plaintiff to show that
she suffered a severely disabling emotional
response to the defendant's conduct. Har·
ris 'D. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 570, 380 A.2d
611,617 (1977). The court of appeals went
on to quote comment; of Section 46 of the
Restatement, supra, which says in pertinent part, "[the] law intervenes only
where the distress inflicted is so severe that
no reasonable man could be expected to
endure it." Harris, 281 Md. at 570, 380
A.2d at 616-617.
The Harris court also indicated that "it
is for the court to determine whether, on
the evidence, severe emotional distress can
be found; it is for the jury to determine
whether, on the evidence, it has in fact
existed." 281 Md. at 571, 380 A.2d at 617.
The Reagan court then proclaimed:
We think the evidence in this case
clearly established that appellee's distress is not a "nueurotic overreaction
to trivial hurts" which "are the price
of a complex society." It is not "transient and trivial." Nor is it of such a
nature that a "reasonable person in
civilized society should be expected to
endure it."

Reagan, 70 Md. App. at 507, 521 A.2d at

